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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT 1
SALT LAKE CITY CO,RPORA TION WAS WITHOUT P·OWER TO PASS CHAPTER 2 OF TITLE 32 OF
THE REVISED O·RDINANCES OF SALT LAKE CITY,
1955.

POINT 2
CHAPTER 2 OF TITLE 3 2 OF THE REVISED
ORDINANCES OF SALT LAKE CITY, 1955, VIOLATES
THE CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF
SE~CTION 7, ARTICLE I, CONSTITUTION OF UTAH.

ARGUMENT
Point 1. Salt Lake City Corporation was without power to pass Chapter 2 of Title 32 of the Revised
Ordinances of Salt Lake City, 1955.
Appellants cite Sec. 10-8-40 and Sec. 10-8-84,
UCA 1953, for legislative grant of power to Salt Lake
City to pass the subject ordinance. That the latter
section gives no such power is no longer debatable
since this precise question, involving these two sections,
has already been determined by this Court. In American Fork City, v. Robinson, 77 Utah, 168, 292 P.
249, this Court said '~The last statute quoted (Comp.
Laws Utah 1917. Sec. 570x87. now Sec. 10-8-84
UCA 19 53) is merely in aid of the express powers
elsewhere granted.'' Any other construction of this
section would be an absurdity. This section ( 10-884) provides that cities "may pass all ordinances and
rules. and make all regulations, not repugnant to law,
necessary for carrying in to effect or discharging all
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powers and duties conferred by this chapter . . . ,
and to provide for the general welfare of the inhabitants and to enforce such ordinances by fines and
penalties. Since, presumably no ordinance is passed
which is not for the general welfare of the inhabitants,
to hold that the section gives to cities the power
claimed for it by appellants would be to say that the
Legislature said in effect to the cities ~'You may do
all of the things enumerated in the first 83 sections of
this chapter, and in addition to these, you may also
do anything else.,
Power to pass this ordinance must therefore be
found, if at all, in Sec. 10-8-40 UCA 1953. This
section authorizes cities to "license, tax, regulate and
suppress billiard, pool, bagatelle," etc. Possibly the
most significant issue to the determination of this
case is the meaning of the term "suppress" as used in
this statute. Appellants cite three cases to show that
suppress means substantially the same thing as prohibit,
but the cases are by no means consistent. The court
said in Johnson v. Town of Philadelphia~ 47 So. 526,
527, 94 Miss. 34, 19 LRA, NS 637, 19 Ann. Cas.
103, "A statute, authorizing a municipal corporation
to ~suppress' skating rinks, gives no power to prohibit
them." In a recent decision ( 19 50) the court said
that where a statute gave the city power to license,
tax, regulate or suppress billiard tables (identical wording to that in our statute), use of the word "suppress"
conferred upon the city the power, as a police regulation, to suppress unlicensed billiard tables doing business without a license, but not the power to prohibit
them. City of Meadville v. Caselman~ 227 SW 2d 77,
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80, 240 Mo. App. 1220. Since the term '~suppress"
is not entirely free from ambiguity, it is necessary to
determine what meaning was intended by the Legislature in enacting Sec. 10-8-40 UCA 1953.
It is not necessary to look beyond the statute
itself to find exactly what was intended, although
this Court has already determined that intent, as
pointed out later in this brief. Appellants quote only
a part of Sec. 10-8-40. The entire section reads as
follows:
'~10-8-40.

Resorts and amusements. They may license, tax, regulate and suppress
billiard, pool, bagatelle, pigeonhole or any other
tables or implements kept or used for similar
purpose; also pin alleys or tables, or ball alleys;
may also license, tax, regulate, prohibit or suppress dancing halls, dancing resorts, dancing
pavilions, and all places or resorts to which
persons of opposite sexes may resort for the
purpose of dancing or indulging in any other
social amusements."
As pointed out by the decision of the lower court,
''It will be noted by an examination of the above-referred to statute that in the first portion of the statute
the city may regulate and suppress certain items, one
of which is the subject of this action. In the other
portion of the statute the city has the power to prohibit and suppress. Apparently the Legislature, in
passing this statute, made a distinction between prohibiting and suppressing."
Nor does counsel for appellants seriously contend
that the terms are synonymous in spite of his state-
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ment to that effect. (Note on page 22 of appellants
brief "In any event the ordinance of Salt Lake City
amounts only to a suppression of the machines as the
case of Ex Parte Lawrence, supra, makes abundantly
clear. The effect is not, as stated by the lower court,
an absolute prohibition", and similar statements elsewhere in appellants brief. )
It is most interesting to note that counsel for a ppellants (page 21 of appellants brief) cites Sec. 17-5-27
UCA 1953 purporting to give counties the power to
suppress and prohibit, and by implication urging that
the Supreme Court of the State of Utah should find
that the comparable section pertaining to cities means
something different from what it says because it is
'.'inconceivable" that the Legislature intended to grant
broader power to counties than to cities. This grasping for straws hardly seems to require rebuttal.
It seems perfectly clear from the foregoing, that
Sec. 10-8-40 UCA 1953, gives to cities, in the first
part of the statute, the power to regulate and suppress, but not to prohibit the activities which are the
subject of this action. It is therefore necessary to determine the effect of the subject ordinance.
It should be observed that the preamble and the
title of the first section of the subject ordinance refer
to Hprohibition of pin ball machines". It is not difficult to determine that that is precisely what was intended-an absolute prohibition of these devices.
A pin-ball machine is a device with which the
owner offers to the public, for a fee, the right to play
and operate such device for such amusement as he may
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derive therefrom. This ordinance prohibits their use
in the only places where their use is possible. It could
be argued with equal cogency that an ordinance prohibiting the use of motor vehicles on city streets was
suppressive only, because they could still be used in
one's home or back yard-or that a statute prohibiting
motion picture theatres from admitting the public
for an admission fee was suppressive only, because
the owner could still invite his friends to the theatre
gratuitously. In Johnson v. Town of Philadelphia,
supra, the ordinance in question required skating rinks
to be closed after 6 P.M., when the statute empowered
the city to regulate and suppress skating rinks. The
court found this to amount to a prohibition of skating
rinks. The court there said ''Under the pretense of
regulating a business, the business attempted to be
regulated cannot be destroyed. This was not the intention of the Legislature. If the Legislature had intended that amusements of this character could be
prohibite·d by a municipality, they would have said
so in unequivocal terms."
It is important to observe that great reliance is
placed by appellants on the case of Ex Parte Lawrence,
55 Cal. App. 2d 491, 131 P 2d 27, construing a
city ordinance similar to that of appellants. In the
Lawrence case the court said ''In the case now before
us, regulation, not prohibition, is decreed by the ordinance. The games are proscribed only in places of
business or in any other 'place of public resort', and
exception is made of the amusement zones described in
another Long Beach ordinance. In other words, 'pin
hair and other games denominated in the ordinance
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may be maintained at private house or in certain delineated amusement zones., The clear and unequivocal
implication is, that if it were not for the amusement
zones in Long Beach, where pin ball machines could
be operated, that the ordinance would have amounted
to a prohibition, and the court would have struck
down as ultra vires an ordinance such as that passed
by appellants, and in this regard, it is clear that the
Lawrence case constitutes strong support for respondents position.
The Utah case of American Fork City v. Robinson, supra, is consistent with the foregoing discussion
and with the authorities cited distinguishing suppression from prohibition of amusement devices. A careful reading of this case makes it obvious that appellants
have wholly misconstrued the holding of this case,
as shown by a confusing attempt to find something
in the case that is simply not there. The facts were
simple. One ordinance prohibited the use of billiard
and pool tables in public places, another prohibited
them in club rooms. The latter was being tested, the
former was not before the Court. The Supreme Court
simply held that the ordinance went too far in prohibiting their use, when the enabling act authorized
only suppression. The indisputable implication is that
had the other ordinance, prohibiting their use in public
places, been before the court, it would have struck
down that ordinance also. Nowhere does the court
say, or imply, that the ordinance was not broad
enough, as appellants contend. On the contrary, the
court says, HThe first statute referred to (now Section 10-8-40 UCA 1953) plainly confers power with
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reference to billiard and pool tables; and does not extend beyond the regulation or suppression of keeping
them" and it seems clear that the court said in effect
that prohibiting the playing at billiards or pool does
extend beyond the regulation or suppression of keeping them, that it had already gone too far and had in
fact prohibited rather than suppressed them.
Appellants attempt to find a distinction in the
American Fork City case between "use" or "playing
at billiards" and the ~~keeping of billiard tables". No
such distinction exists. The ordinance before the court
in that case read in part: ~~Sec. 3. Billiards and Pool.
It shall be unlawful for any person to keep for use
in any Club Room in this city any billiard or pool
table . . . ", so that ordinance did specifically attempt to prohibit the keeping of billiard tables, and
not, as has been said, the playing at billiards. When
that court said "The part of the ordinance in question
does not deal with the subject of keeping billiard or
pool tables ... " it merely said in effect that the ordinance attempted to prohibit billiard and pool. rather
than to ·regulate and suppress the keeping of them.
While the decision in the American Fork City
case is clear and unambiguous, it should be noted that
the significant facts and argument before the court in
that case, as found in the abstract and briefs of appellants and respondents in that case, concerning power
of the city to pass the ordinance were practically identical to the facts and arguments presented in this case.
Since the pertinent statutes remain unchanged, and
since the legal issues are indistinguishable, only by a

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9

complete repudiation and reversal of its former unanimous decision could this Court uphold the validity
of the appellants ordinance.
In NasPell v. Ogden City, 249 P. 2d 507, this
Court said:
''We are committed to the principle that
cities have none of the elements of sovereignty,
that 'any fair, reasonable, substantial doubt
concerning the existence of the power is resolved
by the courts against the corporation (city)
and the power denied'. Utah Rapid Transit
Co. v. Ogden City, 89 Utah 546, 58 P 2d 1,
and 1 Dillion, Municipal Corp., 5th ed., p 448,
Sec. 237; Salt Lake City v. Revene, 101 Utah
504, 124 P 2d 537 ... So firm have we stood
in construing express grants of power to cities
as to conclude that cities have no implied power
to prevent billiard playing, where the Legislature granted express power to 'license, tax, regulate and suppress billiard tables ... ' American
Fork City v. Robinson, supra ... The policy
of our law thus is settled. The rule promotes
a wholesome, uniform orderliness among the
municipalities of the state. Its wisdom is not
open to question at this date, and we ought not
depart from it lightly."
Attention is again called to the dissent in the
Nasfell case, cited by appellants, wherein Justice
Crockett said "I expressly agree with Mr. Chief Justice Wolfe's statement, 'some of our holdings we have
too narrow 1y construed the gran ted powers' '', citing
the American Fork City case and others. Without
questioning the wisdom of the court in thus ''narrowSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ly construing the granted powers", it is significant to
note that the American Fork City case was decided on
October 11, 19 3 0 ~ in a unanimous decision. Since
that time the Utah Legislature has been in general
session fourteen times~ and has not seen fit to change
in any way, the statute so construed by this Court.
Certainly if there remained any doubt about the extent of the grant of the power in this statute, that
doubt has been resolved by the tacit approval of fourteen State Legislatures of the narrow construction of
the subject statute. It seems also apparent from the
several opinions in the Nasfell case that although one
may disagree with the wisdom of these decisions, very
strictly construing grants of power to cities, that it is
recognized that such is the law of this State, and that
the great importance of the doctrine of stare decisis
far outweighs any considerations that would lead to
reversing the decisions of this court of so long a
standing.
Point 2. Chapter 2 of Title 32 of the Revised
Ordinances of Salt Lake City 19 55, violates the constitutional due process clause of Section 7, Article I,
Constitution of Utah.
Certain facts we believe to be of common knowledge, without reference to statutory or municipal law,
judicial authority, or expert testimony. Pin-ball
machines have been used for many years to provide
such amusement as may be obtained threfrom. Many of
them are readily adaptable and convertible into gambling devicest and no amount of whitewash could conceal
the fact that they have been so adapted and converted
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on numerous occasions, in violation of state and municipal gambling laws, although, that this is their sole
purpose we vehemently deny. It was clearly the purpose and intent of defendants in passing the subject
ordinance to find a short cut in the enforcement of the
existing criminal gambling laws by absolutely forbidding their use, and no one will be deceived or misled by
legal rationalizing of appellants, e.g., that the ordinance only regulates and suppresses their use. The same
motives would be equally valid in prohibiting the
multitude of other recreational, amusement, athletic
events, and other sports and activities, which likewise
can be, and frequently are, made the basis of violations
of the gambling laws of this State. This is an attempt
at Hpreventive criminal legislation" which is repugnant
to all our concepts of fair play.
That reasonable regulation of the operation of
pin-ball machines is proper and warranted is not denied,
but the subject ordinance if enforced, would, as it was
intended to do, put out of business all pin-ball machine
operators, including the prohibition of many innocuous machines, designed for amusement only, and
operated for amusement only.
The waning efficacy of constitutional due
process, particularly in the U.S. Constitution, and to
a much lesser degree in the various state constitutions,
and the corresponding increase in the police power,
has to a large extent been necessitated by the increasing
complexity of our society. Since the invalidation of
the National Industrial Recovery Act, no important
federal legislation has been held unconstititional on
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any grounds. Some states have, by judicial decisions,
almost completely abrogated the due process and other
constitutional provisions and given carte blanche
authority to the lawmakers, through their police power, to legislate what in their opinions will best serve
the so-called general welfare. But it will be a sad day
in the history of political democracy when substantive
due process is dead and the "tyranny of the majority"
becomes absolute.
Although most of the cases cited by appellants
on the question of constitutional due process are distinguishable and not in point here, such as the Lawrence
case, where due process and police power were considered in the light of an ordinance which only regulated and suppressed the operation of pin-ball machines,
a few of the States highest courts have determined the
due process question as it relates to pin-ball machines,
and it is not denie·d that at least two of these
have decided that an ordinance prohibiting them did
not violate the constitutional provisions of those
States. The Supreme Court of this State has never
gone so far in destroying the rights of minorities for
what is believed by the legislators to be in the best
interests of the general welfare.
Since this Court has already decided, in the American Fork City case, that a municipality has no power
to prohibit the activities enumerated in the first part
of Sec. 10-8-40 UCA 1953, it should be unnecessary
to determine the question of constitutional due process
at this time. However, when the issue is presented to
this Court in a proper case, where minority interests
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do not have available the facilities of any other forum,
serious consideration must be given to the extent to
which the police power may be used to reduce to impotence the due process clause of our constitution.

CONCLUSION
This Court has already determined that cities do
not have the power to prohibit pin-ball machines, but
only to regulate and suppress them. When, in the exercise of such power, they exceed the bounds of regulation and suppression, as appellants have done in this
case, it is the duty of the courts to strike down such
ordinance as ultra vires as the lower court has done, and
that decision should be affirmed.

R. J. RIMENSBERGER
Attorney for Respondents
404 Dooly Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
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